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In what follows we consider the question of boundedly rational learning and expectation formation by 
economic agents. Every-day observation suggests that informational constraints shape an individual’s 
objectives, their learning activity and ultimately the type of decision rules they adopt. It also 
suggests that behavioural issues that arise through the interaction of an individual with their economic 
environment and their perception of that environment might be important when attempting to 
understand how economic agents actually formulate decision problems. This interaction may induce 
behaviour which is far from the fully rational model of homo economicus that provides the standard 
paradigm of economic theory. It also seems important to recognise that a limited knowledge of the 
environment may affect, not only information sets but also the manner by which people learn and 
hence behavioural theories of learning would seem to be called for. Herbert Simon, in his outstanding 
original contributions to the theory of boundedly rational behaviour discussed the distinction between 
procedural and substantive rationality and a similar distinction could perhaps be usefully drawn 
between procedural and substantive methods of learning.
In this chapter we explore the role of artificial neural networks in providing a conceptually simple, 
“non-structural” , procedural model of how agents might learn to approximate their true but unknown 
conditional expectation function and hence form “boundedly rational” expectations. The minimal 
information required, simply a knowledge of the input and output variables, does not appear to seri­
ously hinder the performance of the approach, either in theory or in practice. Moreover in principle a 
neural network approximation can evolve in complexity and hence accuracy as knowledge of the envi­
ronment increases; such adaption to the environment reflects a behavioural aspect of learning which 
is invariably missing in the standard models of learning assumed in economics. In this chapter we 
examine the performance of neural network learning, first very briefly in theory and then empirically 
with two examples drawn from macro-economic policy issues. Our results, while positive regarding 
the application of neural network learning, lead us to  suggest caution against drawing specific con­
clusions regarding economic behaviour or policy that are dependent on specific and potentially ad 
hoc assumptions as to how people learn and hence adjust their expectations. The question of how 
individuals learn in economic environments needs to be considered more deeply and incorporated 
into a fully integrated theory of boundedly rational economic behaviour.
I would like to thank Robin Wensley for several very rational discussions about bounded rationality 






















































































































































































Given the critical role that expectational forces have assumed in economics and the 
intellectual effort that has been devoted to their study it is perhaps surprising that 
we still have a relatively crude understanding of how expectations are actually formed 
and adjusted in the light of events. The available econometric evidence on the Ra­
tional Expectations Hypothesis, for instance, is at best ambiguous if indeed it does 
not clearly indicate rejection (see for example, Favero and Hendry (1992)). This 
undoubtedly comes as little surprise to many confirming the apparently consistently 
“irrational” behaviour regularly observed in experimental settings (see inter alios 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Tversky, Slovic and 
Kahneman (1991).
How should economists respond to these results? The contrast between formal 
optimal decision theory on the one hand and common sense and every-day observation 
on the other is too strong to ignore and yet it seems surprisingly difficult to give up the 
notion of rationality in expectation formation entirely. Baumol and Quandt (1964) 
nearly thirty years ago referred to “ an irrational passion for dispassionate rationality” 
and Bray and Kreps (1987) note “a failing of economic theory in general has been 
that it has proved remarkably resistant to movements away from models with full 
rationality and consistency”. Economists it would seem have been more concerned 
with how people should behave rather than with how they actually do behave.
We are naturally led to models of boundedly rational behaviour of some form, 
and the need to refine our understanding of how economic decisions are actually made 
if they are not always to be based on strict adherence to subjective expected utility 
maximisation by rational agents with perfect recall and perfect powers of inference 
-  homo economicus!. The dominance of the rationality paradigm is tied most prob­
ably to an intellectual complacency that derives from the precision of the concept 
and the corresponding apparent lack of precision in alternative notions of bounded 
rationality. The means by which individuals learn, forget, process information and 
hence adjust expectations then becomes central to our understanding of bounded ra­
tionality and while any number of convenient assumptions can be made no generally 
accepted consensus or unambiguous theory as to what determines reasonable bound­
edly rational behaviour or learning appears to be in place. Instead the results we 
have regarding learning seem to relate more to the properties of particular statistical 
algorithms such as Least Squares or Bayes rule rather than to am underlying and 
more broadly justified model of economic behaviour for the construction of sensible 
decision rules in the face of limited knowledge of the economic environment. Why 
should economic agents be expected to use Least Squares, for instance, as opposed 




























































































as forms of stochastic approximation algorithms and given that there are a host of 
apparently equally justified alternatives both within and outside this class a better 
understanding of the behavioural basis of learning may be needed. We need to be 
careful that the conclusions we draw in any exercise that involves learning actually 
have some basis in economic behaviour and reality and are not just an artifact of 
the assumed statistical algorithm. Learning needs to be seen as an integral part of a 
boundedly rational decision problem and the manner by which we assume individuals 
learn justified in that context.
Common-sense also suggests that informational limitations imposed by a par­
tial knowledge of the economic environment shape an individual’s objectives, their 
learning activity and ultimately we would also expect the type of decision rules they 
adopt. This interaction between an individual and their perception of the economic 
environment in which they exist may induce behaviour which ranges far from the fully 
rational model of homo economicus that forms the standard paradigm of economic 
theory. It is important to recognise that these informational constraints may also 
affect the manner by which people learn, not only their information sets, and hence 
behavioural theories of learning again appear relevant. It seems strange from the 
behavioural point of view, for instance, to assume as is the case with the standard 
statisticad models of “rational” learning , that agents have complete knowledge of 
the relevant economic structure and yet are assumed to be completely ignorant of 
just a subset of the parameter values within that structure1. The economic inter­
actions that have taken place in the past to have left an individual in such an odd 
state are unspecified. A more reasonable position might be that an agent’s knowledge 
of the structure and their learning activity evolve symbiotically and the manner by 
which learning takes place adapts to their increased understanding of their economic 
environment which in turn may grow, according to economic incentives, through de­
liberately increased interaction with that environment. Some flexibility within the 
method of learning is then needed as the agent’s approximation to reality improves. 
Otherwise assuming that the structure itself is known and fixed from the outset may 
suggest one particular method of learning as optimal which may be completely in­
appropriate if the structure were initially unknown (and vice-versa). The trade off 
between robustness to mis-specification and efficiency is well recognised in statistics.
In this chapter we seek to discuss these issues by emphasising the interaction 
of the agent with the environment in which they Eire forced to take decisions. “Be­
havioural” models of decision making are, of course, far from new in Economics and 
were strongly emphasised in the work of Herbert Simon and others in the 1950’s and 
1960’s (see, for instance, Simon (1955,1959,1982) and Alchian (1950)). In particu­
1 Often for instance the “regression parameters” are assumed to be unknown but the residual 




























































































lar Simon stressed two aspects of boundedly rational behaviour; satisficing and the 
limited cognitive powers of economic agents. He also drew a distinction between pro­
cedural and substantive rationality and a similar distinction could perhaps be usefully 
drawn between procedural and substantive methods of learning. Substantive ratio­
nality is more concerned with the end results or choices individuals make whereas 
procedural rationality is concerned with the process by which these choices are made. 
While all learning is in one sense therefore procedural some models of learning ap­
pear to be more concerned with the properties of the end results of learning rather 
than with the behavioural basis or the manner by which learning takes place. Is con­
vergence to a rational expectations equilibrium for instance a desirable or necessary 
objective for a model of learning under bounded rationality?
Taking these observations into account, the view of learning that we put forward 
below is one in which individuals construct explicitly approximate models of their 
environment which are updated as their information improves through either active 
or passive learning and that the decision rules they adopt reflect the fact that they 
know they hold mis-specified models of reality. Learning then is seen to apply both to 
the structure and any relevant parameterisation that the approximation entails. In 
principle the whole branch of non-parametric inference can be brought to bear on this 
problem although we only consider one approach based on artificial neural networks 
below.
Artificial neural networks provide a conceptually simple procedural model of 
how agents might learn to approximate their true but unknown conditional expec­
tation function and hence form “boundedly rational” expectations. The minimal 
structural information required, simply a knowledge of the input and output vari­
ables, does not appear to seriously hinder the performance of the method either in 
theory or in practice. Moreover in principle a neural network approximation can 
evolve in complexity and hence accuracy as knowledge of the environment increases 
reflecting the behavioural aspect of learning suggested above. Such “non-parametric” 
learning schemes that require no ex ante knowledge of the structure may serve as good 
rules of thumb that have satisfactory operational characteristics and it is therefore 
of interest to explore how they perform in comparison with standard methods such 
as least squares learning that requires full knowledge of the structure to deliver good 
results.
The next section reviews aspects of boundedly rational learning, expectation 
formation and decision making and emphasises the procedural and behavioural char­
acteristics of neural network learning. Two applications of the method to macro 
policy problems are then provided in section 3. The first considers the role of learn­




























































































Gordon (1983) and centres on the policy maker’s desire to establish credibility. The 
ability of a policy maker to “ surprise” the private sector is clearly dependent on how 
the private sector forms expectations and learns and hence the potential to exploit 
its reputation in policy making is also critically dependent on how the private sector 
learns. The second application considers the Sargent/Wallace hyperinflation model 
used by Marcet and Sargent (1989) to investigate the impact of least squares learning. 
We find, for example, in this second exercise that the domain of attraction of the lo­
cally stable equilibrium is apparently much wider with neural network learning than 
with least squares learning although convergence is to a different stationary point in 
each case with a consistently lower rate of inflation being found by neural network 
learning across a wide range of simulations. The sensitivity of the least squares in this 
example is in marked contrast to the observed robustness of neural network learning.
2 B ounded  R ationality  and Learning
Simon (1976) suggested two forms of Bounded Rationality; Substantive and Proce­
dural. “Behaviour is substantively rational when it is appropriate to the achievement 
of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints”. Sub­
stantive rationality then focuses on the outcomes or choices made by economic agents 
whereas procedural rationality requires that observed behaviour is the outcome from 
some process of appropriate reasoning and action given available knowledge and pow­
ers of computation. Simon characterises standard economic analysis as resting on two 
assumptions; the identification of a goal such as utility maximisation and substantive 
rationality. Psychologists on the other hand, have been more concerned with identify­
ing the process or procedure that has determined behaviour which is then considered 
to be procedurally rational. In the context of a game of chess, Simon argues that 
as the complexity of the decision problem grows we are naturally forced to induce 
procedural rationality in place of substantive rationality which involves a shift from 
optimality to finding a good method of selecting moves. As in this example, but also 
more generally, the limited cognitive powers of economic agents forces the change 
from optimising to satisficing behaviour. It is perhaps also important to recognise 
that “rationality” has to be interpreted with care since it is not in itself absolute but 
only defined relative to a given loss function. Rational behaviour is then associated 
with action consistent with that loss function and different loss functions will imply 
different rational behaviour. The commonplace understanding of “rationality” is the 
application of correct reasoning to a given problem and this can clearly be applied 
both to evaluate the “rationality” of the outcomes of a decision problem as well as the 




























































































limited capacity to reason both because of limited information and limited powers of 
computation.
We should also briefly note the implications of the Theory of Cognitive Disso­
nance developed by Festinger (1957) which argues amongst other things that individ­
uals strive for cognitive consistency. The observation by psychologists that individ­
uals dislike inconsistency in their ideas and act to reduce it does not however imply 
full rationality, merely that individuals will adjust their subjective beliefs to achieve 
internal consistency which may not lead to what economists would call a rational ex­
pectations equilibrium. Since internal consistency does not necessarily coincide with 
the objective consistency of the correct model structure the argument that learning 
should lead to a rational expectations equilibrium is weakened. Since removing in­
consistency does not then imply convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium, 
justifying a learning scheme by its ability to converge to the rational expectations 
equilibrium would not then necessarily seem to be supported behaviourally.
Simon’s argument for focusing attention on procedural rationality given the lim­
ited cognitive powers of economic agents argues against the full structural knowledge 
assumptions frequently employed in rational learning schemes and against the use of 
standard statistical algorithms that rest on these assumptions to generate “optimal” 
results. As elsewhere in economics such optimal decisions that follow from solving 
some marginal or first order condition often pay little attention to the behavioural ba­
sis for carrying out the optimum action. Alternatively, so called ad hoc decision rules 
or “rules of thumb” can be put forward that represent actually observed behaviour 
or are explicitly behaviourally justified given the assumed limited information and 
reasoning power of the decision maker ( see, for instance Baumol and Quandt (1964), 
Radner(1975), Day(1967), Crain et al. (1984) and Wall(1993). It is interesting to ob­
serve from these references that at least in some cases such satisficing behaviour can 
converge over time to optimal behaviour. These behavioural theories of action focus 
attention explicitly on the process by which decisions are made and therefore fall into 
the class of procedurally rational schemes; Radner (1975) , for instance, considered 
the allocation of effort by a manager between different tasks leading to behaviour 
which he called “ putting out fires” and Baumol and Quandt (1964) and Day (1967) 
consider other strategies corresponding to what may be easily recognised from every­
day observation as reasonable behaviour but which does not necessarily immediately 
deliver the optimal result. What lies at the heart of the issue is the nature of the 
loss function and the relevant behavioural process and constraints if we wish to for­
malise the agent’s boundedly rational decision problem to find the “optimal imperfect 
decision” . When attempting to construct a general theory of boundedly rational be­




























































































procedurally rational behaviour. 2 Since removing constraints imposed by ignorance 
or the lack of information is the obvious objective of learning one step in this process 
is then to consider procedurally rational learning schemes and the behavioural basis 
for learning in economic environments.
2.1 P ro c e d u ra l  L ea rn in g
How can we then develop procedurally rational theories of learning? Everyday life 
once again seems to indicate that we do not in fact need a complete knowledge of 
our environment to be able to explain behaviour. When learning to drive a car, 
for instance, I have no need to solve Newton’s Laws of motion or solve complex 
differential equation systems describing the physical forces operating on the car. Not 
only do I in fact not know the correct model, it seems that I don’t even need to 
know it in order to achieve my objective. Clearly the design of the car has embodied 
some of the required physical knowledge in a system which I take for granted and 
within which I operate. My information set is then simply the available sensual 
input variables along with a desired target and presumably a fairly crude method of 
combining them together as an approximation to the physical forces operating on the 
car to produce an outcome which hopefully robustly gets me to were I want to go. The 
“ad hoc" rules of thumb that we use everyday when driving a car serve in place of a 
precise and most probably complex “optimal!’ decision rule based on a full knowledge 
of the relevant environment. When driving, the error between the target and the 
present state is feedback into an approximate physical model to determine action that 
invariably has some robustness characteristics in order to insulate outcomes from the 
consequences of the mis-specification inherent in using the approximate model and 
also from potentially unanticipated shocks 3.
Both these characteristics, robustness and the use of limited information ap­
proximations in decision making, seem to be elements reflected in many everyday 
economic actions and can be formally justified. In a slightly different context, Salmon 
and Young (1979) emphasised the distinction between good, bad and optimal decision 
rules stressed by Rosenbrock and McMorran (1971). The argument lies in the fact 
that many formally “optimal” control rules are blind to mis-specification and depend 
for “optimality” on a precise knowledge of the environment; the parallel with the
2Kent Wall (1993) has recently provided a clear statement of these issues and also an approach 
to modelling the adaptive nature of boundedly rational decision making.
3Alan Kirman, who clearly has at least an unbounded memory, has recently pointed out to  me a 
passage , in Machlup(1962), that makes several similar points to those above regarding the need to 





























































































learning issue would seem to be exact. The practical electrical engineer responded to 
the apparent failure of such “optimal” rules by implementing control strategies that 
explicitly included integral or error correcting action, which is in general lacking in 
state feedback rules. A degree of integral action of appropriate form in a decision 
rule may accommodate an imperfect model of the environment and ensure that the 
objective is robustly achieved despite a lack of knowledge of the true structure. The 
implication for our present discussion of learning would seem to be that there is no 
need to necessarily consider the question of convergence of a learning scheme so as 
to provide an exact representation of reality ( even if that were possible) as long as 
economic agents recognise that they are using mis-specified models and adjust their 
decision rules accordingly to take up the slack created by their lack of knowledge. 
The learning decision is then intimately tied with the choice of action implemented 
to achieve the ultimate economic objective and the relevant loss function for learning 
is not then simply the criterion function that evaluates the standard statistical loss 
but one that reflects the true economic cost of action under ignorance.
The contrast with the way that learning is often viewed in economics is stark 
since these issues seem to be generally ignored and attention is often focussed instead 
on the debatable question of convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium. Jus­
tifying the use of a particular learning model by emphasising the properties of the 
end result of learning is a substantively rational argument whereas models of learning 
that focus more the means by which individuals acquire and subsequently process 
information are procedurally rational. Closely connected with procedural learning 
would also then seem to be the question of use of approximate models.
2.2 L east S q u a res  a n d  B ay esian  L ea rn in g
Let us now briefly consider how least squares and Bayes’ rule, stand as procedural 
learning devices. There are two issues that need to be separated; that of how informa­
tion is accrued and then subsequently how it is processed. The role of the economic 
environment and the agent’s approximation/perception of that environment plays a 
critical role in both aspects.
In the case of least squares, the implicit model would seem to be that the 
economic agent passively receives new signals one after the other as time advances. 
The sequential nature of information accrual and processing follows from the standard 
statistical model in which new information is viewed as arriving sequentially, and 
effectively from a single source although parallel algorithms of information processing 
may in fact be more relevant to human learning. Psychological research suggests 
that we bring different bundles of information together about different aspects of a 




























































































in parallel as particular events imply new information simultaneously about several 
different aspects of a  decision problem. If the economic agent employed a multivariate 
model then in one sense data arrive from a number of different sources simultaneously 
but we would then also need to recognise the obvious limitations of least squares when 
there are informational feedbacks and potentially several endogenous variables in the 
model. A more sophisticated statistical estimation method that ensures consistency 
may be required. Again the role of the agent’s model or perception of reality is 
potentially crucial in determining the mechanics of their learning.
One justification for least squares is of course that within a particular class of 
models (such as the classical linear regression model) it provides the most efficient lin­
ear unbiased estimator and so it would be rational to use it although outside this class 
it may not necessarily have particularly desirable properties. Similarly assuming lim­
ited computational and cognitive powers it might behaviourally be more reasonable to 
model economic agents as employing suboptimal or inefficient statistical algorithms 
for learning. Parallel information processing algorithms may be substantially more 
efficient computationally than sequential methods although we have to be careful to 
discriminate between numerical and statistical efficiency. The least squares estimator 
retains its relative statistical efficiency independently of how it is numerically calcu­
lated. Nevertheless it can certainly be the case, as several of the simulations below 
indicate, that least squares can be extremely slow to converge which may be unreal­
istic if it is to provide a reasonable model of how economic agents learn. From the 
procedural point of view economic agents might in these cases take deliberate action 
to speed up the process of learning.
In a market context there are a number of examples, such as for instance mo­
nopolists exploring their demand curve or search theory, where deliberate action may 
be taken to recover information and more general models of interaction and matching 
provide a clear behavioural basis for learning which would seem to deviate far from 
the passive statistical model implied by least squares. The issue again lies with the 
nature of the loss function. Least squares is not itself forward looking in the sense 
that the loss that is measured relates solely to the cumulative sum of current ac­
tions. Active experimentation is not seen to be beneficial in that the economic value 
of information is not reflected in the statistical loss function and a wider economic 
loss function has to be considered to induce active learning, see Easley and Kiefer 
(1988) Kiefer (1989) for instance. Given the discussion above regarding convergence 
it is interesting to note that again from this point of view it can be shown that full 
convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium may not be justified on economic 
grounds when the costs of extra information accrual outweigh the benefits of greater 
accuracy or efficiency, see McLennan (1984). Altering the information accrual pro­




























































































within which agents perceive themselves to be operating and their method of infor­
mation processing. However least squares itself is blind to these issues and simply 
provides a potentially efficient information processing algorithm. One obvious ques­
tion is whether human learning given limited cognitive abilities can be well described 
by an efficient statistical algorithm or not.
Perhaps more relevant to human learning is robustness to mis-specification 
rather than efficiency. Prom this point of view least squares forms a best approxima­
tion in the least squares sense given the assumed model structure. The standard as­
sumptions justifying both least squares and Bayesian learning rest on unattractively 
strong informational assumptions to generate attractive theoretical results. When 
the true model is not assumed to be known both approaches can produce divergence. 
Nyarko (1991) for instance has shown that when the true model does not lie in the 
support of the prior beliefs assumed by a Bayesian monopolist who is trying to learn 
his demand function, his beliefs and consequently actions may oscillate in a never 
ending cycle. Similarly, Brousseau and Kirman (1993) with a symmetric duopoly 
find a similar conclusion using least squares learning with the implication that the 
economic agents drift endlessly without ever learning to believe in anything. Such 
cyclical divergence has also been found , for instance, by Radner (1982), Bray (1982) 
and Blume and Easley (1982). Examples of explosive divergence or convergence to in­
correct models can also be relatively easily found in the literature. Do we believe that 
such behaviour is reflected in the retd world or does the problem lie with the assumed 
model of learning? The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that agents would 
reject this instability and instead find a stable even though imperfect approximation 
to reality on which they could base their decisions.
Another aspect of models of learning that implicitly rests on an assumption 
that the correct model is being estimated is the “turn off” phenomenon. Associated 
with convergence and consistency, whether it be to the true parameter values or not, 
is the fact that the impact of the innovations in a recursive least squares formulation 
of learning becomes less and less over time as the variances of the estimated param­
eters shrink to zero. So if agents either assume that they know the correct model 
or at least are using a fixed approximation then the least squares learning algorithm 
will, in general, gradually turn itself off as it converges. This result which indicates 
convergence in probability is inappropriate if the agent is in fact facing a non constant 
data generation process as is the case of course with the feedback of learning onto 
the economic structure or when the agent is continuously changing his approximate 
model. If the agent recognises that he is dealing with a non-constant approximation 
to the true data generation process then it might be appropriate to instead employ 
a constant learning rate rather than one that decreases over time. In this way the 




























































































in information that arose under such a non-constant data generation process. It is 
important to note that least squares learning implies that economic agents respond 
only to the current innovations and ignore other, “dynamic” properties of the inno­
vation sequence such as the integral of past innovations or the rate of change of the 
innovations. It is in this sense that the least squares model of learning is blind; as 
mentioned above it does not look forward but also it does not allow the agents to look 
back and assess their performance. The reason for this is of course that the statistical 
method essentially assumes that the model being estimated coincides with the data 
generation process. It is not unreasonable to expect economic agents to make use 
of mis-specification checks to assess their performance but this is, at least strictly, 
outside the least squares learning process. If the agent detected serial correlation in 
the innovations, for instance, or some other dynamic pattern then a learning method 
that was able to automatically respond by switching to say generalised least squares 
or changing the model specification might describe human learning better given that 
the agent will be aware ex ante that his assumed model is only an approximation 
to the data generation process. A learning method that is able to respond to any 
structural information in the innovation sequence that goes beyond just the current 
observed innovation and considers potentially dynamic functions of the innovations 
and does not turn off may provide a better procedural model of human learning than 
that given by least squares.
Given these arguments we feel the procedural basis for least squares learning 
seems to rest on fairly thin ground both as a general model of information accrual and 
as a method of processing information. The model of an economic agent as a passive 
sequential information processor that relies on an assumption that he holds a correct 
model of his economic environment seems some distance from what might be required 
for boundedly rational learning. Moreover it is of course still open to question that 
economic agents might only be able to employ relatively simple suboptimal methods 
of information processing rather than the efficient least squares estimator. Human 
frailties and cognitive constraints may be more relevant in describing how individuals 
learn than how an efficient statistical algorithm should compute an estimate.
Bayesian learning, because of its wider probability framework can, in principle, 
relax some of the reservations regarding least squares learning. In particular it appears 
easier to integrate the statistical and economic decision problems. Nevertheless Bayes 
methods also rest on strong informational assumptions to deliver good results and 
can yet yield inconsistency, see Diaconis and Freedman (1988). The major difficulty 
with Bayesian learning seems to be that there is substantial evidence that Bayes 
theorem lacks empirical relevance and hence its procedural justification is weak. For 
instance Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) show that likelihoods and preferences 




























































































the existence of subjective probabilities. Moreover experimental subjects axe found 
to update probabilities but they don’t appear to use information efficiently in that 
posterior probabilities differ quantitatively and systematically from those predicted 
by the use of Bayes rule. cf. Nelson and Winter (1982), Edwards (1968), Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974), Cyert and De Groot (1987) . Grether (1980), (1992) also 
describes experiments in which it seems clear that individuals systematically fail to 
take “proper” account of prior probabilities. Apart from the systematic deviations 
from rationality (as defined by Bayes Rule) detected in psychological research the 
general lack of numeracy skills in most individuals that has been well documented 
more generally ( see Paulos(1991)) seems to suggest that the computational burden 
of applying Bayes rule rigorously prevents its adoption as a reasonable procedural 
model of learning by most economic agents.
2 .3 N e u ra l N e tw o rk  L ea rn in g
There are alternative approaches to modelling learning that relieve at least some of 
the problems with the standard methods outlined above. We concentrate here on 
techniques that essentially provide non-parametric estimates of the unknown quan­
tities which may be unknown parameters or more generally conditional expectation 
functions representing the boundedly rational expectation generation mechanism of 
economic agents. No assumption about the true model structure is required to im­
plement these procedures, only information as to the set of relevant conditioning or 
input variables and of course, the output or target. In this way the information 
requirements correspond to those employed by Fourgeaud, Gourieroux and Pradel 
(1986) who emphasised that in general we do not need structural information to be 
able to generate rational expectations in a linear model. An estimate of the reduced 
form may be constructed from simply a knowledge of the conditioning exogenous 
variables in the system and the output variable. The neural network technique used 
below differs in the rejection of least squares as an information processing tool and 
the relaxation of the implicit assumption that the reduced form is linear in the con­
ditioning variables 4. A neural network essentially provides a time varying, flexible 
functional form that delivers a Minimum Mean Square Error approximation to an 
unknown conditional expectation function or target series at each point in time.
Artificial neural networks then represent sophisticated approximation devices 
whose structure is inspired by biological models of how the brain functions. Assuming 
a boundedly rational agent wishes to approximate his conditional expectation function
4 Hal White has recently collected together a number of his important papers on Neural Networks 





























































































for some variable y given a conditioning information set {xi, i = 1 . . .  r} the neural 
network will determines a particular function g, such that y = g(x, 9). The biological 
analogy comes from referring to the inputs as neurons which send signals, the values 
Xi, through a network architecture to the output y. These signals can be transformed 
at any stage, either at the output or at any intermediate stage when there are ” 
hidden layers” in the network. The simplest such structure arises if the output is just 
a linear combination of the inputs so that y = x'0  and the network g(x, 6) =  x'0  is 
then just a linear regression.
One physical analogy is that certain neurons may remain dormant until “fired” 
sending an impulse to the output. Mathematically this can be represented as
y = F (x 'P )
where
F(A) =  { 1 l f A - Ao 
1 0 otherwise
where Ao is some threshold value. This threshold logic unit may be replaced by any 
smoothly increasing function such as a normal or logistic cumulative density function 
giving rise to the familiar Probit and Logit models.
y Output
Figure 1: The simplest Neural Net: a linear regression
A further physical analogy and the really significant feature of neural networks 
comes through the introduction of a layer of hidden units that act effectively as 
unobserved state variables. In this case the inputs send their signals not directly to 
the output but to an intermediate level of processing units that function in exactly 




























































































parallel nature of information processing appears as each input potentially activates 
each hidden unit simultaneously which then in turn passes its transformed signal, in 
parallel, to the output. Figure 2 describes a simple single hidden layer feed forward 
neural network.
Such a network is termed feedforward as the information flow is in one direction from
the inputs towards the output. Substantially more complicated network structures 
with multiple layers with feedback as well as feedforward information flows can be 
used.
Each hidden unit produces a signal Oj j  = 1. . .  7 where (ij = ip (fa ~tj) that is 
sent to the output as a' 13. So we have
y = F  (a!(3) = F (£ )  ip(fa7j) fa) =  g (x, 8) 
i=1
where the parameters 8 =  (fa, 7 ') ' are known as connection strengths and the function 
ip (.) is generally taken to be some, so called, squashing function or sigmoid function 
such as
ip(z) = (1 +  exp (-2))-1
for each hidden unit.
Thus a neural network approximates the unknown mapping between the inputs 




























































































as the basis of the approximating space. Other basis functions such as rational poly­
nomials, Fourier series or spline functions are often used elsewhere in approximation 
theory. The distinguishing feature of Neural Nets is however the role of the hidden 
units that as state variables are defined endogenously so as to construct the best 
approximation to the target at each point in time given the inputs. The choice of 
spanning function and the number of hidden units are at the control of the agent and 
determine how close an approximation is obtained. The parameters 6 still have to 
be determined and there are various approaches that can be employed including that 
of nonlinear least squares. One procedure that has been used by cognitive scientists 
and studied by White (1990) is a recursive “learning” procedure known as back prop­
agation. In this case a local gradient descent is implemented to deliver the MMSE 
approximation based on the distance of the output or target, y , from the approxi­
mation, in which the connection coefficients are updated period by period according 
to the rule.
=  @n—! 7? V Qn {ijn 9n)
where gn = gn0 n- 1) andV<?n =  Vg(xn,0n-i) and are the predicted output and the 
gradient based on the previous parameter estimates. As such the method of back 
propagation is one form of stochastic approximation algorithm considered originally 
by Robbins and Munro(1951). The parameter rj is referred to as the learning rate and 
controls the impact that the innovations have on updating the parameter estimates. If 
this learning rate is fixed at some constant value the network has the continuous ability 
to pick-up shifts in structure whereas if it decreases as in recursive least squares with 
iid observations at a rate of n " 1 then , as described above, eventually the innovations 
will have no impact on revising the parameter estimates and the turn off problem will 
appear. Back propagation is statistically inefficient relative to nonlinear least squares 
and susceptible to several other difficulties including converging to a local rather than 
a global minimum however despite these shortcomings it describes precisely how we 
feel economic agents who know that they have an approximate model of reality will 
learn. Moreover it is computationally simpler to implement than least squares and 
perhaps more in line with cognitive constraints. For these reasons we have used back 
propagation in the examples below with a fixed learning rate.
Since the neural net algorithm constructs a time varying nonlinear approxima­
tion to the unknown conditional expectation function it is quite different from the 
least squares or Bayesian algorithms that essentially assume there is a fixed constant 
structure characterised by the value of some subset of parameters which must be 
learnt. As the neural net does not assume there is a single invariant structure to be 
found it overcomes the fundamental contradiction with the use of the least squares 
learning. This contradiction arises as least squares rests on the assumption that the 




























































































model creates nonstationarity in the data generation process even if the underlying 
model without learning is stationarity . The neural net approach to learning and 
expectation formation is free of such ambiguities.
There are also a number of potential theoretical advantages from using neural 
networks, in the first place they provide the ability to combine information from dis­
tinct sources (separate models) and process this information in a parallel fashion. One 
possible advantage is then in the speed of convergence of learning. In addition, given 
the non-parametric nature they can be very robust to poor information and when im­
plemented sequentially can track with relative ease a non- constant data generation 
process. However, the main reason why they are of interest in the present context is 
the powerful theoretical results that are available demonstrating their ability to ap­
proximate unknown functions. For instance Hornik, Stinchcombe and White (1989) 
(1990) have recently shown, under certain relatively weak regularity conditions, that 
a particular neural network can approximate any measurable function to any required 
accuracy, see also White (1989) (1990). Thus while avoiding the need to specify the 
true model structure, these methods have the potential to gain convergence to the 
true rational expectations equilibrium! Moreover as discussed in these references 
the ability to approximate sufficiently accurately rests on the network structure it­
self evolving as information is built up. Thus economic agents who employ neural 
networks to learn and approximate their conditional expectation functions can con­
tinuously update their approximation to reality until the economic trade offs might 
indicate that further accuracy was unnecessary. Despite this powerful approxima­
tion ability we have only explored fixed structure networks in the examples below 
and hence have generated only partial approximations to the unknown expectation 
functions.
The justification of the method as a procedural learning method can be seen, 
quite simply, to be a sensible procedure for agents to learn in the absence of knowledge 
of the correct model structure. It rests on minimal assumptions and is robust through 
providing a time varying nonlinear approximation to the true conditional expectation 
function which in principle it could arbitrarily well approximate.
3 E xam ples
3.1 M o n e ta ry  P o licy  a n d  In fla tio n
The presumption that the private sector’s expectation of government policy may crit­
ically affect the impact of that policy has been central to the study of macroeconomic 




























































































maker in the eyes of the private sector since it is believed the opportunities open 
to a policy maker with high credibility may differ substantially from those available 
to the same policy maker with little credibility. Credibility itself is thought to be 
enhanced when expectations are confirmed by the policy maker’s actions and so how 
the private sector learns and adjusts its expectations is central to an analysis of cred­
ibility. Invariably in this literature the private sector is assumed to be able to form 
fully rational expectations and the policy implications of credibility and reputation 
building have been based on this assumption. A number of papers (in particular, 
Barro and Gordon (1983), Barro (1986), Backus and Driffill (1985a,b), Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986) and Basar and Salmon (1990a, b)) have considered the question 
in some detail5. In particular in Basar and Salmon (1990a) it was emphasised how 
the natural asymmetry in the information pattern facing the policymaker and the pri­
vate sector allows the policy maker, when acting as a Stackelberg leader, to actively 
intervene in the learning process of the private sector and hence directly influence the 
formation of (rational) expectations by the private sector. In this way the govern­
ment is able to choose its policy taking full account of the effect that this policy will 
have on the private sector and hence also on the evolution of its own credibility. The 
significance of the Stackelberg solution is that the policy optimisation problem facing 
the government must explicitly recognise the dual role of the optimal policy in that its 
informational impact on the private sector’s uncertainty about the government’s pref­
erences must be traded off against the immediate effect on the government’s welfare. 
In this way the Government’s credibility and the resulting inflationary bias evolve 
from a substantially more complex, non-certainty equivalent problem than is the case 
with the steady state Nash (and certainty equivalent) solution provided by Cukier­
man and Meltzer (1986). The endogeneity of reputation building in this example, 
through the closing of the information loop, serves to sustain the zero inflationary 
bias result, which somewhat surprisingly given the Stackelberg structure, is credible 
when only stagewise precommitment by the policy maker is possible.
This earlier analysis rested, however, on the unrealistic assumption that both 
parties, the government and the aggregate private sector, hold common and correct 
beliefs (if not observable information) regarding the true structure of the economy. 
Given this full knowledge of the probability distributions describing the structure of 
the economy the problem facing the private sector when forming its rational expec­
tation is simply a classic example of signal extraction. We now consider the private 
sector to be uncertain not only about the government’s preferences but also about 
the structure of the process by which the government’s preferences are determined. 
In particular we start by considering the private sector learning both in the sense of 
updating its estimate (or rational expectation) of the unobserved state variable (the




























































































government’s preference parameter) and also by learning any unknown parameters in 
the model through which these preferences are determined6. As in a standard adap­
tive control problem with a single decision maker the fact that there are unknown 
parameters will usually induce nonlinearity and a non-certainty equivalent control 
problem for which the optimal policy will reflect the non-separability of the predic­
tion and control aspects of the policy (see Goodwin and Sin (1984)). In what follows 
we ignore this aspect of active learning and therefore do not attempt to develop the 
optimal policy that would reflect the full impact of the private sector’s parametric 
learning.
We employ the same model as Basar and Salmon (1990a,b) which is a finite 
horizon version of a dynamic “Barro and Gordon” model developed by Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986). We also restrict attention here to the Nash (or discretionary) 
solution since it is substantially easier in this case to study the impact of parametric 
learning on the evolution of credibility and the inflationary bias of monetary policy.
We first derive the Nash Solution for this model under disparate beliefs with­
out learning so that the private sector in fact holds mistaken views on the way the 
government’s preferences are determined 7 and consider the evolution of the gov­
ernment’s credibility and the ensuing inflationary bias. In constructing its optimal 
policy the government is assumed to be fully aware of this situation. We then con­
sider the effect of the private sector recognising its ignorance and employing the two 
learning schemes discussed above, least squares and neural network learning. Un­
der least squares learning the private sector updates its estimates of the unknown 
parameters (determining the governments preferences) while simultaneously forming 
rational expectations of these preferences. The neural network learning procedure 
approximates the entire conditional expectation function for future monetary policy 
given observations on past money supply.
T he N ash  Solution  w ithout Learning
We consider a model in which the monetary authority wishes to maximise a finite 
horizon objective function given by
(3)
i=0 L
6Apart from Basar and Salmon (1990b), Martin Cripps (1991) has also considered parameter 
learning in the Nash solution to a static version of the Cukierman and Meltzer model
A lternatively this situation could correspond to a regime change in which the private sector’s 




























































































with respect to its choice of monetary growth rnf, where e< =  m, — S,(/t) represents 
the surprise in inflation (or alternatively monetary growth) determined by the private 
sector’s rational expectation E[mt 11,} =  <5, (/») given the observable information 
li =  m,_2, • • • mo} and x t is a preference parameter of the monetary authority
that trades off the benefit from the growth induced by surprise inflation with the 
cost of a non zero level of inflation. The preferences of the monetary authority are 
assumed to evolve according to a first order autoregressive process given by,
Xi = p Xi-i + A (1 — p) + Vi (4)
where i/, follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance n'l- The private 
sector is assumed to be able to observe only the actual monetary growth rate which 
deviates from the planned money supply process, m?, given some imperfect monetary 
control. In particular it observes m* where
m, =  m? +  (5)
and ipi is a random disturbance assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance a?. Since the private sector does not know the policy preference 
parameter, Xi, it is faced with a natural signal extraction problem when forming 
its expectations. We now assume that the private sector believes the government’s 
preferences evolve according to equation (4) but parameterised by (p2 ,A 2) whereas 
the true preferences are determined by (pi,Ai) and, for the moment, there is no 
learning of the unknown parameters, p and A  by the private sector. As shown below 
the optimal Nash solution to this policy problem (in which the only role of the private 
sector is to form rational expectations of the future course of monetary policy) is affine 
in the preference parameter,
=  Mi Xi +  ki (6)
In which case the rational expectation of the private sector will be generated by the 
conditional expectation;
<5* =  +  ki (7)
where the conditional expectation is generated by the Kalman Filter;
*i+l|i =  P2 % - i  +  p2 Ki {rrii -  M i& i^  -  kt) +  A2(l -  p2) (8i)
Ki = Mi
Mi D |i - i
P Ì^ l  S .l- 1
































































































£ o i - i  =  a*o (8™)
Given this characterisation of the private sector’s prediction problem the monetary 
authority solves for the optimal Nash decision rule by maximising J i, given by
N ■ 1 
Ji =  £ { Z  +  ™%)xi -  MiXiii-iXi -  kiXi -  - (ra f)2]}
i=0 1
or
N ■ 1 
J1 =  ^ { Z  ^*[mi Xi -  -  ^C™?)2]}
i=0 z
where the non constant part may be rewritten as
E{(m pNx N -  \ ( m pN)2)PN + Y .  F lm i x i ~  l(™ i)20M i+lxi+nix i+1}}
2 i=o 2
At the final stage i = N , the optimal policy can then simply be seen to be,
mpN =  XN
Moving back one period, i = N  — 1, the optimisation problem becomes 
max E {m pN_ 1x N- i  -  mPN_1)2 -  pcNx N\N_iXN \ x N- i )
m N - 1 ^
where
XN\N-1 =  P2(l -  K N-\ M n -\ )x N_ i\N_2
+  p2A'w-i(m^_1 -  kN
+  ^ 2(1 — fn) + (nKN-xipN-i
and c/v =  
and so we find
"iftr-i =  (1 — 0 cnP2PiK n - i 'x n - \  -  pct/ptK N -tA iQ . — pi)
Mn- i kt
Proceeding in this way we find the optimal monetary policy at stage N-2 from, 
max E {m pN_2XN- 2  ~  2)2 — Pcn- \ x^ _ ^ _ 2Xn - i — /3d /v -ir^ -iW -2}
m N -2 2
where




























































































djv-i =  Ppicn{1 ~ K n - \M n - \)A \  +  (1 -  pi) 
leading to an optimal policy rule for period N  — 2 of the form;
mPN_ 2 =  ^N -2XN -2 + kN -2
where
M n -  2 =  1 —  0P i P2CN-i K n -1
and
fcN-2 =  -j9p2^4l(l -  P\)cn- i K n - 2 ~  @dN-\P2KN-2
Continuing in this way we find a general form for the Nash policy rule to be given by 
the following set of equations;
7 7 l(( —  M n X n  “I-  kj i
where
Mn = ( 1 -  p\P2@cn+\Kn) 
kn =  f3p2{dn+\ d- Ai(l  p\)cn+\}Kn 
C j i  —  fip\P2(\ KnMn)cn+l "h Afn 
dn =  /?P2(f -ffn-^fn)(Cn+l-^l(f Pi) "h dn-j-i)
subject to
cjv =  Afw =  1, djv — A;at =  0
together with the Kalman filter equations (8( f ) , 8(iv)) given above . Essentially 
what is required is the solution to
. P\P2Cn+\Mn^n\n—\
l - M n = W2^-------- r V ~Mn^ n\n— 1 H"
for M„ at each stage, n, from 1 to N. It can easily be shown that this finite horizon 
solution coincides in steady state and under common beliefs (pi = p2 ,A \  =  A2) with 
the solution given for the infinite horizon problem by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).
The effect of the incorrect beliefs held by the private sector in this Nash game 
is explored by simulation since it is not straightforward to unravel analytically the 
complex interactions of all the parameters on the quantities of interest. Figures 3 and 
4 show the evolution of inflationary bias and credibility for the various runs described 
in Table One.
A simple Gauss Seidel iterative scheme was employed to ensure convergence 
of the policy parameters Mi, and ki and those of the prediction or signal extraction 





























































































S im ulations for N ash Solution  w ithout Learning
Table 2:
S im ulations for N ash Solution  w ith L east Squares Learning
Run NP Pi P2 0 a% A 1 M a
1 81 0.9 0.9 0.95 1 1 1 1 i i
2 202 11 0.5 » » » J) 1 » 0.8
3 40 11 0.1 » » 1 1 5? 1
4 25 11 0.5 » 0.5 11 1 11 5) 0.8
5 55 1 >J » 1 0.5 11 11 11 0.8
6 19 1 11 » 5} 1 0.5 ” 11 0.8
7 14 1 11 » 0.5 0.5 11 11 11 0.8
8 13 ” 11 0.1 5) » 11 11 » 0.8
NP - The number of iterations with SOR (Successive Over Relaxation) iteration 




















































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Credibility with Least Squares Learning
by A,, is defined in a similar manner to the steady state measure used by Cukierman 
and Meltzer where A, =  p2(l — K tM,). Basically credibility is thought of as be­
ing determined by the speed by which the private sector learns. The sequence {A,} 
converges in steady state to the weight A that the private sector uses to discount pre­
vious observations when forming its expectations. So it essentially measures the speed 
with which the private sector recognises shifts in government preferences, the higher 
A the less important are recent developments in the formation of current expectations 
compared with the prior view and the lower the government’s credibility8. Figure 4 
shows how A, evolves over the simulation period. Inflationary bias is determined as 
bi = M1A2 -I- hi, being the unconditional expectation of planned monetary growth in 
each period.
As can be seen from these figures there is a common general pattern to the 
evolution of credibility and inflationary bias under most of the alternative parameter 
settings. Inflationary bias falls initially for several periods before attaining a long 
run base level before rising to unity as the end of the policy interval approaches. 
Similarly but less dramatically the government’s credibility is typically seen to fall
8There are important differences between this steady state view of credibility and the transient 
























































































































































































Figure 7: Convergence of private sector’s estimate of p
initially, stabilise and then fall as the policy interval comes to an end. To examine 
the effects of the private sector holding a different assumption about the value of 
p, Run 1 (common beliefs that pi =  p2 =  0.9) may be compared with runs 2, 5 
and 6. As the private sector’s assumed value of p decreases to 0.1, runs 2 and 6, 
implying a belief that government preferences are changing more slowly than they in 
fact are, we see the level of inflationary bias uniformly increases and the government’s 
credibility decreases. The actual level of credibility is determined directly by the value 
of p assumed by the private sector, p2, as can be seen by the definition given above. 
The impact of p2 on the level of inflationary bias is more subtle and results from 
its effect on the corresponding optimal policy rule. Run 5 reverses the manner of 
misperception of p in that the true value is 0.1 where the private sector incorrectly 
believes that the government’s preferences are changing more rapidly (p2 = 0.9). In 
this case although there is no direct impact, credibility is substantially reduced when 
compared with Run 1, however the level of inflationary bias is also reduced reflecting 
again the optimal policy when p =  0.1. Run 4 may then be used to observe the effect 
of a low common belief that p =  0.1 and it can be seen together with the results 
of Run 6 that the level of inflationary bias is critically determined by the assumed 
value of p2- If the private sector believes the government’s preferences are changing 




























































































credibility low. Runs 7, 8 and 9 may be compared with Run 1 (all have common 
beliefs with p =  0.9) to examine the effect of changing the degree of uncertainty 
by altering the variances associated with the various stochastic terms in the model. 
Perhaps the most interesting observation here results from reducing the variance on 
the uncertainty about the government’s preferences by a factor of 10 which leads to a 
steady growth in inflationary bias over the period but with a consistently high level 
of government credibility. Similarly increasing the degree of noise in observing the 
planned monetary growth rate leads to a relatively high level of credibility but with 
an average level of inflationary bias. Finally from Run 10, we can see the effect of 
the government discounting the future substantially more rapidly than in the base 
run (Run 1). In this case an average level of credibility is associated with a very high 
level of inflationary bias.
These results indicate the sensitivity of existing policy conclusions regarding 
the role of credibility to the assumption that the private sector is able to form ratio­
nal expectations and has full knowledge of the economic structure and the relevant 
parameters. As shown in these simulations the level of credibility and the resulting 
inflationary bias is directly determined by the private sector’s misperception of the 
true structure.
L east Squares Learning
We now assume that the private sector recognises the non-zero mean in the innovation 
of monetary growth ,that arises from its misperception of p, and from that infers that 
its view of p is inconsistent with the true value. The private sector is by assumption 
only able to observe the actual monetary growth when forming expectations and 
hence also when updating its estimate of p. It is assumed however to be aware of the 
structural form of the model which forms the basis of its ability to learn using least 
squares. In particular it knows that,
mi =  +  ipi
and that
m j =  MiXi + ki (9)
hence
rrii =  M tXi +  k i +  ip, (10)
It is also assumed to be aware of the structure of the state equation generating the 
government’s preferences (except for the value of p) and so equation (10) may be 
rewritten




























































































Rearranging this expression we find that
mi — AM , -  k ,=  p[M i(xi-1 -  A)] +  M,u, +  ipi 
which represents a standard regression relationship of the form
Vi =  p zi +  ik  (11)
where
and
y i  = r r i i  — A M i  —  k i
Zi = M ifa -i  -  A)
The only complication with this formulation lies in that the private sector is unable to 
observe the state variable Xj_i but they can form an estimate essentially by
the Kalman Filter as described by equations (8(i)-(iv)). Substituting this estimate we 
find an operational algorithm in terms of the constructed variable z, =  —
A)9. Applying the standard recursive least squares algorithm to (10) we have
*  Pi— lZi r -  *  1
: P*~ l  +  —2 , p  i2  — z i P i - l ]
U  U  ' 1 l — l ^ i
Pi = Pi-1 - p ? - l%a l +  P i-iz f
where = M?crl +
Figures 5, 6 and 7 describe a number of simulations to investigate the effect 
of least squares learning on the previously determined Nash policy. The plots in 
these figures indicate a representative stochastic run given one particular drawing 
from a normal random number generator for the stochastic terms in the model. In 
general, convergence was found to be substantially more difficult to achieve than in the 
previous experiments without learning. A relaxed Gauss Seidel procedure was needed 
in many cases to achieve convergence of the policy and prediction parameters. The 
dominant observation from these figures is how dramatically the policy optimisation 
has been affected by the dynamics of the learning behaviour of the private sector. 
Given this we can see the same general pattern of a low level of credibility being 
associated with a high level of inflationary bias. Two aspects of the learning behaviour 
seem to be particularly important. In the first place even when the private sector
9 A s  mentioned above we are ignoring the obvious statistical feedbacks between the state estimation 
and parameter estimation. It is also clearly stretching rationality pretty far to assume with this least 
squares assumption that the private sector have sufficient knowledge to construct y* and 2* from 




























































































has a correct prior on the value of p in terms of its mean but a large degree of initial 
uncertainty about this value, the learning procedure may actually drive the private 
sector away from its correct initial beliefs. This seems paradoxical but may well reflect 
legitimate behaviour when there is substantial initial uncertainty about government 
preferences. Secondly it can be seen from figure 7 that even after some 25 periods 
the learning scheme generally has a long way to go until convergence to the correct 
value of p. This extremely slow learning would seem to have important implications 
for government policy. The implicit time unit that has been used corresponds to the 
period between policy changes in which case it would seem to be very unwise, as is the 
case with standard policy analysis, for the government to treat the private sector as 
if it knew the true structure of the economic environment. However Figures 5 and 6 
clearly show the critical impact that private sector’s (parameter) learning has on the 
optimal policy in this model. No substantial difference is found between the different 
runs by the end of the period compared with the case of no learning. One effect of 
including learning has been to remove the majority of the difference in credibility 
created by the different assumptions regarding the private sectors beliefs. Ultimately 
the level of inflationary bias is unity with credibility falling only slightly near the end 
of the period. The level of inflationary bias , where comparable, seems to be higher 
than in the case without learning.
N eural N etw ork Learning
To implement neural net learning and expectation formation by the private sector, a 
single hidden layer feed-forward architecture was set up to estimate the conditional 
expectation E[mt | Jj]. Since in this model the private sector only observes actual 
money supply the objective was set to estimate mt based on the first three lags of 
money supply. This can then be viewed as a non-linear, time-varying, autoregressive 
form for the conditional expectation function which, depending on interpretation, 
may be a solved out forward looking expectation process or a non-linear adaptive 
process. From the strategic point of view, it seems that the policy maker should treat 
the neural net expectation as exogenous since although it might be reasonable to 
expect that there is some feedback it is not obvious how it would itself approximate 
the private sector’s approximation. The resulting optimal monetary policy is then 
determined each period by the value of the government’s preference parameter, so 
that mf =  Xi. The neural net approximation is then in effect estimating the value of 
the government’s preference parameter on the basis of past monetary policy. Since 
no structure is assumed to be known by the private sector and the Kalman filter 
is not employed we are not in a position to use the previous measure of credibility. 




























































































private sector’s expectations, however generated, have deviated from actual outcomes. 
The root mean squared error between the actual money supply and the respective 
expectation then measures the cumulative surprise. One set of results are shown in
Figure 8: Least Squares and Neural Net Expectations of money supply
Figure 8 in which a 100 period simulation of the model was run with least squares 
learning under the “mis-specified” assumptions of Run 7 from table 2. The solid line is 
the actual evolution of the observed money supply determined under the least squares 
learning assumption; the dashed line - the neural net expectation and the dotted 
line, the conditional expectation estimated on the basis of the least squares learning 
algorithm. In this particular numerical comparison the neural net approximation 
delivers a root mean square error of 11.22 which is smaller than the least squares 
RMSE of 13.67 despite the fact that the least squares based expectation exploited all 
the (correct) knowledge about the model structure except the correct value of p . The 
least squares based expectation completely fails to capture the degree of movement 
in the money supply series and is generally sluggish in responding to changes in 
direction although near the end of the sample its relative performance improves. This 
simulation is obviously based on particular drawings of the random variables but the 
general pattern of behaviour seems to be consistent across a number of simulations 
that we have examined. It is of course not invariably the case that the RMSE for the 




























































































estimate tends to dominate more often than not, however this example does indicate 
that a private sector with neural net expectations could be surprised less overall than 
if it had formed a “rational” least squares expectation. The implication for the scope 
of exploiting credibility in policy is then presumably that a policy maker should be 
very wary about basing his actions on any perceived opportunities to surprise the 
private sector until he was absolutely certain what the surprise would actually be!
The comparison given above in Figure 8 has to be interpreted carefully since 
the neural net expectation is calculated on the basis of a monetary policy that as­
sumed least squares expectation formation by the private sector. Figure 9, on the 
other hand, shows the observed money supply following from optimal monetary policy 
under both neural net and least squares expectations as well as the neural net expec­
tation calculated under the “neural net monetary policy”. As can be seen from this
Figure 9: Optimal monetary policy under Least Squares and Neural Net Expectations
figure both policy profiles are essentially identical but differ only by a fairly constant 
degree with the neural net policy being more active, perhaps reflecting less ability to 
surprise. In fact as the sample comes closer to the end both policies tend to come 
together. The same shape can also therefore be seen in the neural net expectation 
which is now calculated on the basis of the optimal monetary policy which assumed 
neural net expectations. The fact that the two monetary policies are so similar in this 




























































































mate role, under both assumptions, of the evolution of the policy maker’s preference 
parameter. This similarity is clearly not likely to be reflected in other problems with 
different structures but does indicate that the assumptions required by least squares 
learning may be irrelevant in practice if individuals and the private sector as a whole 
can act so as to approximate the government’s policy mapping sufficiently accurately. 
The strategic implications for exploiting credibility when the private sector does not 
hold or learn rational expectations are perhaps more fundamental.
3 .2  L earn in g  a n d  th e  D y n a m ics  o f  H y p er in fla tio n
Marcet and Sargent (1989) considered the impact of least squares learning in a model 
of hyperinflation analysed previously under rational expectations by Sargent and 
Wallace (1987). Under rational expectations the model has two stationary equilibria, 
one with low inflation and the other, high inflation. Only if the initial conditions 
are chosen to precisely coincide with the low inflation equilibrium will that station­
ary state be obtained. Otherwise the high inflation equilibrium is the attractor de­
spite its perverse comparative static properties in that a permanent increase in the 
deficit will lower the stationary inflation rate. However Marcet and Sargent show 
that under least squares learning either there is convergence to the low inflationary 
stationary state or no equilibrium exists. Thus the high inflationary equilibrium is 
eliminated when agents are assumed to learn by least squares. The additional dy­
namics introduced through least squares learning thus completely alter the economic 
implications of the model; an obvious question is then how these conclusions may 
themselves be affected if economic agents are assumed to learn in some other way 
than by least squares.
The model is written as follows
P t =  X E t P t+ i  +  7 / i t 0  <  A  <  1 , 7  >  0 ( 12* )
h t  =  0 h t~  i  +  £ P t 1 < 0  <  A - 1 , f  >  0 ( 12i i )
ho is given and Pt ,h t > 0.
Pt represents the price level, ht per capita money and Et Pt+\ the private sector’s 
expectation of the price level at time t +  1 based on information available at time t. 
Essentially equation (12ii) states that the government finances a constant per capita 
real deficit of f  through money creation.
Under Rational expectations we impose




























































































where Pt = ^>t+1/p, is the gross inflation rate.
Substituting this expression into the model yields the relationship
Pt+l =  (A" 1 + 9 -  Ç7 A-1) -  e \ - l /p t (14)
and a Rational Expectations equilibrium for {Pt,ht}^l0 is given by the sequence 
{A}(S:0 that satisfies (14); there are two stationary equilibria PI < provided the 
deficit satisfies £ fmax =  A |# +  A-1 -  2(0A_1)ly2j. Only if the initial inflation 
value is chosen so that Po = PI , the low inflation stationary state under rational 
expectations, is that equilibrium found; for any other value Po e  [Pi, A-1) convergence 
to P2 follows.
Marcet and Sargent proceed by allowing the private sector to learn the value 
of Pt by least squares using the available price history . So that given (13)
Pt =
t- i
£ i ? - i
U=o
-t-i
Y , P s P s - 1
L=o
or when written recursively
Pt = Pt- 1 +  ~ R t-\P t- 2  [f(-i — P t-iP t-2} Rt Rt- 1 +  -  \Pt~ 1 — R i-ij
The following dynamic relations then describe the model
where the mapping
- 1  - V (15)
ht = S (P t)h t - 1 (16)
M s(s)1. -*£■]*-. (17)
(1 - AP t) 6
SW)‘ (1-Aft-l5) (18)
effectively takes the perceived law of motion for Pt into an actual law of motion for 
Pt. A stationary equilibrium is then given by a fixed point of S(P) where S{p) ~P  = 0 
and it can be seen that there are two solutions given again by P{ and Starting 
from a given set of initial conditions (Po, Ro, ho) we can then examine the convergence 
of inflation under least squares learning.
Notice immediately an inconsistency with the application of least squares learn­




























































































to which least squares is applied once the feedback in the data generation process is 
recognised but it is also clearly non-constant until the fixed point itself is reached. So 
while learning is taking place the assumption of a constant data generation process 
on which least squares rests is violated.
Marcet and Sargent show both analytically and through simulation that under 
least squares learning;
• P{ is it locally stable iff K  = < 1
• P2 's always unstable and hence P{ is the only candidate for a limit point.
• If Pt ever becomes larger than P% then Pt will be pushed over a singularity at 
i ^ i n t o  a region with no equilibrium. In other words no equilibrium exists 
for Pt >
We introduce neural network expectation formation and learning into the model 
by assuming that the conditional expectation for the future price level is some un­
known but also not necessarily constant function of the current price to be approxi­
mated by the neural net. Writing the neural net expectation as
[EtPt+1] =  /(constant, Pt) (19)
the model becomes
Pt = A[£t.P(+i] +  'yht (20)
ht =  8ht— i +  £Pt
and so prices will be generated by
Pt =  [ [* * + 0  -  0[EtPt+i]-r] (21)
The neural net expectation in (20) was constructed in a similar manner as in the pre­
vious example with a single hidden layer network but with two inputs, a constant and 
the current price level. Unlike the previous example we have tried to mimic forward 
looking behaviour by the private sector by estimating the neural net approximation 
in a loop that enables us to use the previous iteration’s value for Pt+\ as the target for 
the approximation based on the current price. This process was iterated until conver­
gence and hence consistency is found. In addition, since the neural net expectation 
is a function of the current price, which it also determines, a simultaneity problem 
exists that is again resolved by iteration until a consistent value for the current price 
level is employed on both sides of equation (21). This iterative procedure within each 




























































































Table 1: Inflation at 500 iterations under Least Squares and Neural Net Learning
Po e Least Squares Neural Net
1.0 0.0019 1.02519 1.0114
1.0 0.00234 1.03572 1.0133
1.0 0.0024 0.39945* 1.0135
1.0 0.003 0.72960* 1.0158
1.02 0.0019 1.02519 1.0114
1.02 0.00234 1.03572 1.0133
1.02 0.0024 0.74100* 1.0135
1.02 0.003 0.00610* 1.0158
1.0376 0.0019 1.02519 1.0114
1.0376 0.00234 1.03572 1.0133
1.0376 C.0024 1.03769 1.0135
1.0376 0.003 -0.00680* 1.0158
1.5 0.0019 1.02519* 1.0114
1.5 0.00234 0.44180* 1.0133
1.5 0.0024 0.96360* 1.0135
1.5 0.003 0.45940* 1.0158
2.0 0.0019 1.02519* 1.0114
2.0 0.00234 0.18350* 1.0133
2.0 0.0024 -0.02990* 1.0135
2.0 0.003 0.46918* 1.0158
The * indicates non-convergence and negative prices.
question then is whether or not this time varying non-linear dynamic data generation 
process implies an inflation rate f t  that converges and if so to what value? Since the 
model structure including the neural net expectation process is now different from the 
original model with rational expectations it is perhaps not surprising that we do not 
find convergence to the rational expectations equilibria P I,02- Given the difficulty 
of studying the stationary points of the mapping under the neural network assump­
tion analytically a number of simulations were carried out and are reported in the 
following table.
Several aspects of Table 1 are worth noting. In the first place it is clear that 
the neural net learning scheme has always converged regardless of the initial con­
ditions but not to either of the stationary points found under rational expectations 




























































































Table 2: Stationary Inflation Rates under R.E. and Least Squares Learning
£ f t f t Pmax
0.0019 1.02519 1.08381 1.109
0.00234 1.03572 1.07279 1.1085
0.0024 1.03769 1.07076 1.1084
the table) to the same values for a wide range of simulations starting from widely 
divergent initial inflation rates and deficits. The domain of attraction to the relevant 
equilibrium therefore seems to be substantially wider under neural network learning 
than under least squares learning. This robustness to changes in initial conditions 
offers a strong behavioural argument in favour of the neural network learning. Table 
2 below shows the stationary values under least squares and rational expectations 
and the fact that the neural network algorithm does not converge to these values 
could be interpreted in several different ways; either as an indication that an element 
of mis-specification has been introduced into the model through the assumption of 
what may be considered an ad hoc learning rule or alternatively, if the neural net ap­
proximation is justified as a reasonable procedural assumption as to how agents learn 
then since the structure of the model under learning has been changed, a different 
but equally justified equilibrium has been robustly identified which is relevant to that 
new structure. Under the assumptions of bounded rationality that imply that learn­
ing is required in the first place then perhaps we should not be so concerned about 
failing to converge to the rational expectations equilibrium in the long run. The fact 
that the neural network learning rule has not converged to the rational expectation 
equilibrium under the original model structure should also not necessarily cause any 
concern following our earlier arguments since if the equilibrium found is recognised as 
inferior in some way agents could adopt decision rules that included integral action 
to reflect the divergence.
Notice also that the neural net equilibrium inflation rates are also uniformly 
lower than the low inflation equilibrium under least squares learning. The least 
squares learning rule is clearly very sensitive and its performance critically determined 
by the initial conditions and the value of the deficit. Column 3 of Table 1 essentially 
reproduces the same results found by Marcet and Sargent and the sensitivity and 
divergence of least squares learning is in marked contrast to the results for the neural 
network learning. Table 2 also shows the value of 0  = Pmax where there is a singularity 
and beyond which no equilibrium exists under least squares learning. Plots of the 





























































































Figure 10: Least Squares and Neural Net Inflation
the singularity since although locally explosive least squares learning often appears 
to attempt to return towards the equilibrium value. However once having passed 
through the singularity inflation takes a value typically far away from the equilibrium 
and subsequent adjustment is extremely slow. It was also found in the simulations 
that the neural network was quite generally substantially faster to achieve convergence 
than least squares. Figure 10., which shows inflation rates corresponding to the case 
with fa  =  2.0 and £ =  0.003 provides one example of such behaviour as least squares 
passes through the singularity several times and where the robustness of neural net 
learning can be clearly contrasted with the sensitivity of least squares learning. Surely 
on behavioural grounds we would be unlikely to accept such sensitivity as reasonable 
in practice which would further question the value of least squares as a procedural 
model of learning by economic agents.
4 C onclusions
It is clear that much needs to be done to examine the question of boundedly rational 
learning schemes in general but from the experience we have gained and reported 




























































































to be feasible, behaviourally justified and have some attractive properties. Indeed, if 
the limited empirical results reported in the last section are found to be supported 
analytically and to hold more generally, then it would really be astonishing that as­
suming more information about the true model structure may in fact be unnecessary 
and in some cases even detrimental because of the manner in which it was employed. 
In other words, seriously questioning whether least squares or Bayesian learning al­
gorithms are likely to reflect reasonable models of human learning even though they 
exploit full information regarding model structure.
In the two empirical applications above the neural network approach performed 
well in comparison with least squares learning. One general conclusion is to empha­
sise the dangers of drawing specific policy implications based on particular learning 
algorithms given the potential sensitivity to those learning assumptions. This in turn, 
stresses the need for a greater understanding by economists of how economic agents 
with limited information actually learn about their environment and how this affects 
the nature of the decision rules they adopt under bounded rationality. Embedding the 
question of learning clearly within the original economic decision facing the economic 
agent would enable us to evaluate the economic implications of different learning 
schemes under the relevant loss function and may help to provide a clear behavioural 
basis for the manner by which learning takes place.
Market and social interaction are obvious mechanisms by which information 
is accrued and it does not seem clear that the standard statistical regression model 
adequately captures the manner by which such information is captured in the first 
place and subsequently processed. Behavioural models of learning under bounded 
rationality are being developed; Mordecai Kurz (1990),(1991),(1992), for instance, 
has recently emphasised the analysis of rational belief equilibria rather than rational 
expectations equilibria. The critical distinction is, much as argued above, that all 
agents are permitted to hold different beliefs or approximate models of reality which 
are nevertheless all consistent with the observed data. No structural assumptions 
need be made in this model of learning and each agent updates their beliefs in a 
manner which is consistent with their own perception of reality. The neural network 
learning procedure has several of these features since it assumes agents explicitly 
hold an approximate model and also that their learning mechanism is robust to mis- 
specification since it makes few assumptions as to the true data generation process. 
Models of “social learning” , “herd effects” or learning from others have also been 
developed, see for instance Kirman(1992), Ellison and Fudenberg (1992), Topol(1991) 
and Vives(1992), which describe different market or social mechanisms that influence 
the information accrual and/or the information processing aspect of learning. Such 
behavioural models of learning which focus on economic incentives and the process by 




























































































answers as to how economic agents actually do behave rather than how economists 
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